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Reporter : Thomas Bierschenk. Discussant : Klaas van Walraven
1 The panel heard and discussed seven papers, not all of which were equally closely related
to theme of the panel. It is, in fact, reasonable to ask whether we are talking about the
same thing when we address the problems of municipal government in an industrial city
of  four  million  inhabitants  like  Johannesburg  (Etzo)  or  the  national  politics  of
remembrance in a capital city like Windhoek (Gewald) and the issues concerning outlying
rural communities of several thousand people in Senegal and Mali (Kaag, Nijenhuis).
The papers
2 In  his  paper  entitled  "From the  Old  Location  to  Bishops  Hill :  the  politics  of  urban
planning  and  landscape  history  in  Windhoek, Namibia", Jan‑Bart  Gewald  (Cologne)
analyzed  national  politics  of  remembrance  as  expressed  in  city  development  in
Windhoek, Namibia. He showed that the establishment of a new suburb (Hochland Park)
with a completely new street pattern wiped out the memory of an important event in
local and national history, i.e. the forced and violent removal of African town‑dwellers in
the 1950s, while both the colonial conquest and the anti‑colonial struggle are represented
in  urban  space  by  public  monuments.  Thus, official  memory  appears  to  be  highly
selective.  In  the  ensuing  discussion, the  question  was  asked  ‑  but  not  conclusively
answered ‑ as to whether there was a political agenda behind this selectivity, or whether
the latter should be seen as the effect of a multiplicity of contingent causes.
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3 Felicitas Becker's (Cambridge) paper on "Corruption and the decline of local politics in
Southeast Tanzania" started with a brief  summary of state‑locality links in Tanzania.
Against this historical background, she then argued that with the increasingly marked
local presence of the state, the former semi‑autonomy of local political arenas and local
roots of political legitimacy are being increasingly eroded and direct access to the state
becomes a major source of local political power. Despite the fact that the central state in a
way overreached itself with the villagization campaign, it penetrates deeper into the lives
of villagers than the colonial state ever could. The scope of local intermediaries acting
between the state and villagers has diminished as a result.
4 These findings were partly contradicted by EIke Grawert (Bremen) in her paper on "The
decline of  service provision in rural  Tanzania and attempts to reverse it".  Her main
subject  was  the  contradictory  nature  of  decentralization, which  involves, on  the  one
hand, the disengagement of the central state from service provision, while on the other
hand the state maintains control over local politics through powerful commissioners who
are not only centrally appointed, but also remain loyal to the ruling party (giving rise to a
situation of de‑facto one‑party rule in a formally multi‑party system). While the official
motive for decentralization was to increase government legitimacy, the primary driving
force behind it was the foreign donors. Strong vested interests in the government and
party  apparatuses  actually  tried  to  block  it.  The  main  problem  surrounding
decentralization currently remains the financial viability and autonomy of local elected
bodies.  Funds  come  mainly  from  foreign  donors  which  makes  these  bodies  more
accountable  to  the  donors  than  to  their  political  constituents.  The  main  local
beneficiaries  of  the  financial  extraversion  of  local  elected  bodies  are  groups  and
individuals who manage to organize themselves and thus become the privileged owners
of aid. Citizens can not rely on service provision as it depends on complex negotiating
procedures between local councillors, representatives of the central state, foreign donors
and, in some cases, wealthy local patrons.
5 In  his  paper  on  "Multiparty  municipal  administration  and  corruption  in  Cameroon
today", E.S.D.  Fomin  (Buea)  addressed  the  potential  link  between  multipartyism  and
corruption at local level. Based on three case studies, he showed that the extent of local
corruption is not linked to the democratic (elected municipal council) or undemocratic
(local  government  via  central  government  delegates)  character  of  the  local  political
system, and is, in particular, independent of which party (the nationally dominant CPDM
or  an  opposition  party)  governs  locally.  Elected  local  politicians  in  general  and  the
mayors in particular have a certain room for manoeuvre, whatever the type of party
regime. While there is, in fact, generally a high level of corruption at local level, not all
municipal  councils  are  equally  corrupt ;  they  can  play  the  political  game
differently, irrespective  of  whether  the  y  are  members  of  a  democratically  elected
opposition party or CPDM delegates. In other words, similar political configurations can
produce different degrees of corruption. Thus, multipartyism at local level is not per se a
barrier against corruption.
6 In her study on "Local government and social movements in South Africa", Sebastiana
Etzo (Naples)  examined a social  movement fighting for service provision, in this case
electricity supply in Soweto, Johannesburg, as part of a general campaign directed against
the privatization of public services. The citizens' organization in question (the Soweto
Electricity Crisis Committee) was the only case of a textbook "Civil Society Organisation
(CSO)  ", so  dear  to  the  World  Bank  and  other  donors, presented  at  our  panel.
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Paradoxically the CSO in question turned its back on World‑Bank‑sponsored privatization
policy. In fact, when read against the background of the other papers presented at this
panel, Etzo's study would appear to confirm the thesis of South Africa's uniqueness within
the continent in other respects also : e.g. the sheer size of the municipality (four million
inhabitants), the high level of service provision (70% of the population have access to
electricity) and the relatively high legitimacy of a democratic state strengthened by the
"liberation ethos".
7 The  panel  concluded  with  two  papers  which  were  particularly  closely  related
thematically, both to each other and to Eric Hahonou's paper on "La chefferie coutumière
face  au  projet  de  decentralisation  dans  une  localité  de  l'Ouest  africain"  which  was
presented at the plenary session. All three papers deal with small rural communities in
the West African Sahel and concern francophone countries (Niger, Mali, Senegal). In her
paper on "Exploring the context of service provision in Senegal :  Social dynamics and
decentralisation in the Senegalese countryside" Mayke Kaag (Amsterdam) argued that
decentralization is not the direct road to democracy but feeds into ongoing processes of
inclusion and exclusion : while it will open up new arenas for political contest, it will not
automatically prevent elite continuity.  Decentralization will  not automatically lead to
greater transparency and efficiency as is claimed by the "democracy and decentralization
narrative"  which dominates the  development  discourse ;  it  may also  contribute  to  a
proliferation of  norms and ideas, thus leading to greater  administrative and political
complexity and opaqueness instead of the increased accountability of local politicians
and increased control of local people over local political arenas.
8 This theme was also taken up by Karin Nijenhuis (Leiden) in her paper on "Decentralisation
creating  a  new  manoeuvring  space  and  new  power  positions  for  local  traditional
authorities : An example from Southern Mali".
9 Based  on  a  detailed  ethnographic  account, she  argued  that  decentralization  most
probably increases the fragmentation of local  power structures and that it  may even
create a local power vacuum. Old institutions do not automatically disappear when new
institutions are introduced. Instead, a configuration of multi‑layered power institutions is
created which interact and compete in flexible and complex ways.
Conceptual discussions 
10 As is habitual in this kind of exercise, the presentations prompted conceptual discussions
of key terms. In fact, all of the key terms used in the title of our workshop, from "local" to
"politics"  and  "decentralization", were  seen  as  problematic  ‑  indeed, sometimes
extremely problematic ‑ by one or the other of the participants. 
11 In particular, it was proposed that the notion of "locality" should be "deterritorialized"
and that the notion of "politics" should take into account the differentiation between
"government" and "administration" proposed by Mamadou Diouf in his keynote speech.
However, as is equally common in these contexts, the participants were more active in
pointing out the weaknesses in proposed definitions than in providing alternative and
better  definitions  themselves.  For  example, while  the  differentiation  between
government  and  administration  appears  suggestive  at  an  initial  glance, on second
thought, I would be inclined to believe that in the context of empirical studies or actual
political practices as opposed to theoretical discourse, it would probably be difficult to
identify administrative practices that are completely devoid of politics .
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12 On the other hand, it is certainly true that the notion of decentralization makes more
sense in a context informed by French Jacobinism than one inspired by British concepts
of  local  government.  In  this  respect, the  participants  correctly  remarked  that  the
workshop failed to sufficiently discuss a perspective to which it was particularly well
suited  on  the  basis  of  its  composition :  the  systematic  differences, if  any, between
decentralization politics in French‑speaking and English‑speaking parts of Africa. With
regard to the term "decentralization" itself, it  should be kept in mind that in official
development discourse, it is usually used in connotations originating in management and
not political theory.
Policy considerations
13 On a more policy‑oriented level, the panel stressed that any true decentralization process
necessitates  the  decentralization  of  funds.  As  long  as  local  elective  bodies  are
underfinanced, they cannot be expected to fulfil the roles assigned to them. The question
was also raised as to whether it  was constructive to reduce the notion of democracy
exclusively to multipartyism (as is  currently the practice), or whether other forms of
democratic representation might not be better adapted to the realities in many African
countries.
General conclusions
14 On a more general level, the workshop was quite successful in ‑  to adopt the current
social science jargon ‑ "deconstructing normative decentralization narratives", which are
fashionable in the development world at present. These narratives include, in particular :
• the democracy and grassroots narrative, 
• the accountability narrative, 
• the governance narrative.
15 To start with the last, i.e. the governance narrative, decentralization does not constitute a
barrier against corruption (as shown by Fomin). Under certain circumstances, it can even
increase  corruption, especially  under  the  conditions  of  multiparty democracy.  With
regard  to  the  democracy  and  accountability  narratives, it  would  appear  that
decentralization  often  leads  to  a  hybrid, composite  form  of  local  government  and
produces further fragmentation of local politic al arenas and informalization of political
practices (a point made most forcefully by Kaag, Nijenhuis and Hahonoll ‑ the latter in the
plenary  session).  This  not  only  leads  to  a  high degree  of  dilution  of  power  at  local
level, with different veto powers bloc king each other, it also creates a need for constant
negotiation  between  politic  al  actors, thus  reducing  the  predictability  of  political
processes, and  the  accountability  of  local  political  institutions.  The  norm appears  to
involve a composite or hybrid form of local governance with blurred boundaries between
the state and private organizations (including Northern NGOs), the national and the local.
Consequently, local political arenas after decentralization may be characterized by even
lower capacities for regulation and mobilization than previously existed.
16 The question was also raised whether the study of decentralization informs us about
long‑term changes in African societies, in particular with respect to processes of state
formation. No firm conclusion could be reached on this point as the ambiguity of the
situations discovered and analyzed makes it  difficult  to  read the exact  direction the
trends are taking. This difficulty was, of course, partly prompted by our preference for
the  analysis  of  micropolitics, e.g.  the  local  political  dynamics  around
decentralization, and our failure to pay sufficient attention to their  significance with
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respect to changes in vertical relations between the local and the central state. We can
conclude, however, that  decentralization  undoubtedly  complicates  political  games  at
local level. While decentralization signifies the opening up of new political opportunities
and  the  creation  of  space  for  political  expression  for  previously  excluded
actors, ultimately, it may simply increase local veto powers and the number of people
profiting  from  the  state.  While  decentralization, which  in  theory  signifies  increased
procedural homogenization, represents more intensive state presence at local level, in
practice, it  may  result  in  the  greater  fragmentation  of  political  arenas  and  greater
procedural  heterogeneity.  Its  outcome  might  well  be  new  forms  of  local  informal
despotisms which, however, would remain rather impotent in terms of their capacities
for regulation and mobilization.
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